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DOES THE GHOST OF CROWELL V. BENSON STILL
WALK?
By BERNARD SCHWARTZ t
A discussion today of the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson I might,
at first glance, seem no more useful than an ,analysis of any other
supposedly discarded Supreme Court decision. For it has long been
thought that Crowell v. Benson has been laid to rest by later cases.
Thus, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in 1946 referred to "all the casuistic
difficulties spawned by the doctrine of 'jurisdictional fact.' , In view
of the criticism which that doctrine, as sponsored by Crowell v. Benson
. . brought forth and of the attritions of that case through later
decisions, one had supposed that the doctrine had earned a deserved
repose." 2
Pittsburgh S. S. Co. v. Brown' indicates that the ghost of
Crowell v. Benson may still walk in the lower federal courts. That
case involved an action pursuant to Section 21 (b) of the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 4 to restrain the en-
forcement of a compensation order made by the defendant deputy
commissioner. The plaintiff employer moved in the district court for
a new trial on a new record, on the question whether the deceased
lost his life as the result of an accidental injury occurring on the
navigable waters of the United States. Under Crowell v. Benson
plaintiff was clearly entitled to a trial de novo on that issue, but it was
argued that "the holding in that case no longer retains vitality in view
of later decisions of the Supreme Court." ' The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, asserting that "none
of the cases relied upon by the defendants in this respect . . . furnish
any substantial basis for the contention that the Crowell case is no
longer binding upon inferior federal courts." ' Though its doctrine
has been widely criticized, both by members of the Supreme Court
and by legal writers, the case itself has not been overruled. Crowell
v. Benson was consequently held to be binding, and the finding of the
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1. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
2. Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 142 (1946) (concurring opinion).
3. 171 F. 2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), reversing 81 F. Supp. 284, vwdified by 81 F.
Supp. 285, supplemented by 81 F. Supp. 287 (N. D. Ill. 1947).
4. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U. S. C. § 901 (1946).
5. 171 F. 2d 175, 177 (7th Cir. 1948).
6. Ibid.
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district court was affirmed that since "the instant case presents a dis-
pute as to one of the jurisdictional facts squarely within the doctrine
of Crowdl v. Benson," I plaintiff was entitled to a trial de novo on the
single issue of where the deceased met his death.
The Pittsburgh S. S. case shows that the doctrine of Crowell v.
Benson has not yet reached the definitive repose urged for it by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter. At the same time, it indicates the need for a re-
analysis of that doctrine, with emphasis upon its application in the
lower federal courts, to determine whether the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit correctly applied it in a case decided in 1948. It
is therefore intended in this paper to re-examine the doctrine of Crowell
v. Benson, by (1) a presentation of the "jurisdictional" fact doctrine
and its use in that case; (2) an analysis of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes'
opinion in that case; (3) an examination of its application in subse-
quent cases arising under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act; and (4) a discussion of its effect upon the judicial
review of other administrative agencies.
I.
The "law-fact" distinction is one which is fundamental in com-
mon-law jurisprudence and has, indeed, been the keystone upon which
our whole system of appellate review has been built. As applied to
the field of administrative law, this separation of "law" and "fact,"
as Sir Cecil Carr has pointed out, sounds attractively simple. "The
administrative tribunal would find the facts and the courts would not
interfere unless the absence of evidence or the perversity of the finding
required them to interfere." 8 Working from this distinction, our
courts have been constructing a theory of review which has become
crystallized in the so-called "substantial evidence" rule, so that "nor-
mally the scope of review over administrative action is limited to ques-
tions of law and to whether or not the facts underlying the adminis-
trative conclusion are based upon substantial evidence." '
Under the "substantial evidence" rule, the power of the review-
ing court is limited to questions of law. It has no power to examine
administrative findings of fact further than to see that they have a
substantial evidentiary basis. "Such is the full limit of judicial review
of the fact findings of an administrative tribunal when made within
the scope of its jurisdiction." 10 But what if the fact in question is
7. 81 F. Supp. 285 (N. D. Ill. 1947).
8. CAR, CONCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATrV LAW 108 (1941).
9. LANDIS, Crucial Issues in Administrative Law, 53 HMv. L. REv. 1077, 1092
(1940).
10. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 31 F. Supp. 125, 129 (E. D. Ark.
1940), aff'd 310 U. S. 381 (1940).
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a jurisdictional one in the sense that its existence is a condition prece-
dent to the lawful exercise of the administrative power? "If the right
of review is rested on the theory of ultra vires, and an administrative
officer is given authority, for instance, to destroy infected articles or
diseased animals, it is possible to argue that he is 'without jurisdiction'
or authority over articles not actually infected or over animals not
actually diseased." "
To apply the normal theory of limited review to such cases would
seem to run counter to the general policy of Anglo-American law
against allowing inferior tribunals finally to determine the limits of
their own jurisdiction. As stated by Farwell, L. J., in an important
case:
No tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision
finally decide on the question of the existence or extent of such
jurisdiction: such question is always subject to review by the
High Court, which does not permit the inferior tribunal either to
usurp a jurisdiction which it does not possess, whether at all or
to the extent claimed, or to refuse to exercise a jurisdiction which
it has and ought to exercise. Subjection in this respect to the
High Court is a necessary and inseparable incident to all tribunals
of limited jurisdiction; for the existence of the limit necessitates
an authority to determine and enforce it: it is a contradiction in
terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited
power to determine such limit at its own will and pleasure-such
a tribunal would be autocratic, not limited-and it is immaterial
whether the decision of the inferior tribunal on the question of
the existence or non-existence of its own jurisdiction is founded
on law or fact; a Court with jurisdiction confined to the city of
London cannot extend such jurisdiction by finding as a fact that
Piccadilly Circus is in the ward of Chepe.12
In other words, as stated by the Supreme Court, "an agency may not
finally decide the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial
function." '--and where the administrative power depends upon the
existence of a particular fact, it is for the reviewing court to determine
for itself whether that fact existed.
This was the "jurisdictional" fact doctrine at the time Crowell
v. Beson was decided. That case arose under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and concerned a suit to
enjoin the enforcement of a compensation award made under that Act.
The plaintiff alleged that the award was contrary to law for the reason
that the claimant was not at the time of his injury an "employee" of
the plaintiff and that his claim was consequently not within the juris-
11. DIcKIsoN, ADmlNISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREFACY OF LAW 309 (1927).
12. Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee, [1910] 2 K. B. 859, 880.
13. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 369 (1946).
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diction of the Deputy Commissioner. "The fact of employment was
thus made the decisive issue" " and the Court had to determine the
scope of the review available over the administrative finding of that
fact. First of all, according to Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who de-
livered the opinion of the majority, the enabling Act contains two
fundamental limitations upon the right of compensation which it con-
fers. "It deals exclusively with compensation in respect of disability
or death resulting 'from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States' . . ., and it applies only when the relation of
master and servant exists." '5 The administrative fact findings upon
these two issues, the opinion goes on, cannot be vested with the same
finality as ordinary factual determinations. These "determinations of
fact are fundamental or 'jurisdictional' in the sense that their existence
is a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme." 1
The existence of these facts is "indispensable to the application of the
statute, not only because the Congress has so provided explicitly (sec-
tion 3), but also because the power of the Congress to enact the legis-
lation turns upon the existence of these conditions." 17
What is the scope of review then with regard to these "funda-
mental" or "jurisdictional" facts? Clearly, says Chief Justice Hughes,
the reviewing court may determine the question of their existence
upon its own independent judgment. The court in determining
whether a compensation order is in accordance with law may deter-
mine for itself the existence of the "jurisdictional" facts which underlie
the operation of the statute. The opinion does not, however, stop
here, for the reviewing court is not limited to exercising its own inde-
pendent judment upon the administrative record. "There is no pro-
vision of the statute which seeks to confine the court in such a case to
the record before the deputy commissioner 6r the evidence which he
has taken. The remedy which the statute makes available is not by
an appeal or by a writ of certiorari for a review of his. determination
upon the record before him. The remedy is 'through injunction pro-
ceedings mandatory or otherwise' "' 8 -and, on such review proceed-
ings, the party aggrieved is entitled to a trial de novo upon the issues
of "jurisdictional" fact referred to above. The Court thus held, with
regard to the issue of employment, that the plaintiff in the injunction
proceeding "was entitled to a trial de novo; that all the evidence intro-
duced before the deputy commissioner should go for naught; and that
14. Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determina-
tions of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1055, 1056 (1932).
15. 285 U. S. 22, 37 (1932).
16. Id. at 54.
17. Id. at 55.
18. Id. at 63.
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[plaintiff] should have the privilege of presenting new, and even
entirely different, evidence in the District Court." 19
Such, briefly stated, was the decision of the Supreme Court in
Crowell v. Benson. As a leading critic has admitted, "the logical
cogency of the Court's reasoning is impressive." 20 The doctrine of
"jurisdictional" fact is applied with almost mathematical exactness
to reach the result of the majority opinion. The reasoning of the
Court can be stated in syllogistic form as follows:
Major Premise: It is the function of the courts to determine
whether administrative agencies have exceeded their jurisdiction.
Minor Premise: The existence of the employment relationship is
essential to administrative jurisdiction under the enabling Act.
Conclusion: The existence of the employment relation must there-
fore independently be found by a court in order for the court to con-
clude that the agency was acting within its jurisdiction; otherwise the
agency would itself be finding the facts upon which the very exercise
of administrative power depends.21
II.
Under the Longshoremen's Act, the administrative power to act
is dependent upon the finding that the claimant is an employee, for
the authority to make a compensation award does not exist in the
absence of such a finding. The existence of an employment relation-
ship is, however, but one of many facts upon which the administrative
power to award compensation depends. This, indeed, is one of the
great difficulties with the "jurisdictional" fact doctrine. Most statu-
tory schemes imply a large number of facts upon which jurisdiction
turns and broad review over them could, in effect, do away with the
limitations of the "substantial evidence" rule. This is strongly urged
by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Crowell v. Benson:
Logically applied, the suggestion would leave the deputy
commissioner powerless to hear or determine any issue of as-
serted non-liability under the Act. For non-existence of the
employer-employee relation is only one of many grounds of non-
liability. Thus, there is no liability if the injury was occasioned
solely by the intoxication of the employee; or if the injury was
due to the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill him-
self or another; or if it did not arise "out of or in the course of
employment;" or if the employer was not engaged in maritime
employment in whole or in part; or if the injured person was the
employee of a subcontractor who has secured payment of com-
19. Brandeis, J., dissenting, id. at 66.
20. Dickinson, supra, note 14, at 1059.
21. Compare Landis, TH; ADMINISTRATVE PROCESS 127 (1938).
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pensation; or if the proceeding is brought against the wrong
person as employer; or if the disability or death is that of a
master or a member of the crew of any vessel; or if it is that of
a person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any
small vessel under eighteen tons net; or if it is that of an officer
or employee of the United States or any agency thereof; or if it is
that of an officer or employee of any State, or foreign govern-
ment, or any political subdivision thereof; or if recovery for the
disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may be validly provided by state law. And obviously there is no
liability if there was in fact neither disability nor death. It is
not reasonable to suppose that Congress intended to set up a
fact-finding tribunal of first instance, shorn of power to find a
portion of the facts required for any decision of the case; or that
in enacting legislation designed to withdraw from litigation the
great bulk of maritime accidents, it contemplated a procedure
whereby the same facts must be twice litigated before a longshore-
man could be assured the benefits of compensation.22
The majority opinion in Crowell v. Benson does not, however,
go as far as Mr. Justice Brandeis asserts. Not every fact upon which
the administrative authority to decide depends is to be subject to a
trial de novo in the district court. In the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, only two limitations are singled out as "fundamental" and
it is only as to them that the "substantial evidence" rule does not apply.
"These fundamental requirements are that the injury occurs upon
the navigable waters of the United States and that the relation of
master and servant exists." 28 Aside from these two "fundamental"
facts, "there can be no doubt that the Act contemplates that as to
questions of fact, arising with respect to injuries to employees within
the purview of the Act, the findings of the deputy commissioner, sup-
ported by evidence and within the scope of his authority, shall be
final." 24 This is true even with regard to facts upon which the
coverage of the Act depends--i. e., facts upon which the administrative
authority to award compensation turns. Thus, the "substantial evi-
dence" rule is said to apply to the factual question whether the injury
"was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the
willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another"-
in which case, no compensation shall be payable. 5 "While the ex-
clusion of compensation in such cases is found in what are called
'coverage' provisions of the Act . .., the question of fact still belongs
to the contemplated routine of administration, for the case is one of
22. 285 U. S. 22, 73 (1932).
23. Id. at 55.
24. Id. at 46.
25. Longshoremen's Act, 33 U. S. C. § 903 (b) (1946).
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employment within the scope of the Act, and the cause of the injury
sustained by the employee as well as its character and effect must be
ascertained in applying the provisions for compensation." 26
Why does the majority in Crowell v. Benson hold that a trial
de novo is required only on the two "fundamental" facts of employ-'
ment and place of injury? Should there not be the same broad re-7
view of other facts upon which the power to award compensation de-
pends, for is not the administrative jurisdiction dependent upon their
existence also?
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes indicates that it is not enough that
the particular fact be one upon which the administrative authority
under the enabling Act turns for the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson
to apply. The facts of employment and place of injury are "funda-
mental" not because their existence is necessary to administrative
jurisdiction under the statute. "These conditions are indispensable
to the application of the statute, not only because the Congress has so
provided explicitly. . ., but also because the power of the Congress to
enact the legislation turns upon the existence of these conditions." 2
The place of the injury is fundamental in this respect because,
unless the injuries to which the Longshoremen's Act relates occur
upon the navigable waters of the United States, they fall outside the
legislative authority of the Congress under the admiralty power. "The
locality of the injury, that is, whether it has occurred upon the
navigable waters of the United States, determines the existence of
the congressional power to create the liability prescribed by the
statute." 28 Similarly, says the Chief Justice, the authority .of the
Congress to impose liability without fault in maritime cases depends
upon the existence of an employer-employee relationship. "The fact
of that relation is the pivot of the statute and . . . underlies the
constitutionality of this enactment." 29 The facts of employment and
locality of injury are thus conditions precedent to the constitutional
validity of the operation of the statutory scheme. "If the person
injured was not an employee of the person sought to be held, or if
the injury did not occur upon the navigable waters of the United
States, there is no ground for an assertion that the person against
whom the proceeding was directed could constitutionally be subjected,
in the absence of fault upon his part, to the liability which the statute
creates." 3'
26. 285 U. S. 22, 47 (1932).
27. Id. at 55.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 56.
30. Ibid.
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Looked at in this way, the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson is only
an application of the doctrine of "constitutional" fact articulated in
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough.1 The Ben Avon case
is the logical fulfillment of the "jurisdictional" fact doctrine, for, in
this country, the ultimate limits to the lawful exercise of any power
are those contained in the organic instrument. Whenever a constitu-
tional issue is raised, said the Court in the Ben Avon case, a fair
opportunity must be provided "for submitting that issue to a judicial
tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to
both law and facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict
with the due process clause." 2 To vest the administrative finding
with finality would be to allow the administrative body itself to find
the facts upon which the constitutional exercise of its power depends.
Crowell v. Benson applies the "constitutional" fact doctrine to cases
arising under the Longshoremen's Act, though, it should be noted,
it goes one step further, for it requires a trial de novo upon the issue
of "constitutional" fact and not merely independent judgment upon
the administrative record.
The doctrine of "constitutional" fact as it is applied in Crowell
v. Benson is, as Professor Dickinson has pointed out, the doctrine of
"jurisdictional" fact in a special form.33 It "applies to constitutional
limitations on administrative jurisdiction the same reasoning which
the doctrine of jurisdictional fact applies to statutory limitations." 4
In both cases, the administrative power to act depends upon the
existence of a particular fact. In the one, however, the limitation
upon the administrative authority is imposed by the enabling Act; in
the other it is imposed by the organic instrument.
Even if this be the correct interpretation of the doctrine of
Crowell v. Benson, one is not altogether clear why the opinion there
limits its application under the Longshoremen's Act to the locality of
injury and the existence of the employment relation. As pointed out
by Groner, C. J., with regard to the two fundamental facts listed by
Chief Justice Hughes, "The first is easily understandable, the latter
has been sometimes said to be more difficult. Critics of the Crowell-
Benson opinion have wondered what is the difference between the
employment relation and the question whether the injury occurred in
31. 253 U. S. 287 (1920). Ben Avon is still showing remarkable vitality for a
supposedly defunct doctrine. It was adopted by the highest court of New York in
Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N. Y. 374, 73 N. E. 2d 705 (.1947), dis-
cussed in Schwartz, Administrative Law, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 601, 618 (1948),
and was applied in two federal decisions last year, Pichotta v. Skagway, 78 F. Supp.
999 (D. Alaska 1948); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 77 F.
Supp. 675 (E. D. S. C. 1948).
32. 253 U. S. 287, 289 (1920).
33. Dickinson, supra, note 14, at 1072.
34. Id. at 1067.
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the course of the employment or arose out of the employment, or
happened at all, or was self-inflicted." 11 Does the fact of employ-
ment stand upon a different constitutional basis than these other
questions?
It is difficult to see why, if Chief Justice Hughes was correct in
his assertion that the existence of an employer-employee relationship
was essential to the power of Congress to impose liability without
fault, the same was not also true of the relation of the injury to the
employment. If an employment relationship is necessary for the
validity of a compensation scheme, may it not also "be assumed that
where an accident is in no manner related to the employment, ar
attempt to make the employer liable would be so clearly unreasonable
and arbitrary as to subject it to the ban of the Constitution" ? 36 And
would not the same apply to the question of whether there was, in
fact, any injury or disability? Yet Crowell v. Benson lists only the
two "fundamental jurisdictional" facts.
One wonders, too, whether Chief Justice Hughes' assertion that
the existence of an employment relation is essential to the constitu-
tional operation of a compensation scheme would be followed by the
present Court. In the first place, it is the Congress who have the
constitutional authority to define the classes of "employees" who are
to receive compensation.3 7  But, it may be argued, this does not
detract from the proposition that the legislative power is limited by
the bounds set by the concept of "employment." This "argument
assumes that there is some simple, uniform and easily applicable test
which the courts have used in dealing with such problems, to deter-
mine whether people doing work for others fall in [the] class [of
employees]. Unfortunately this is not true. . . . Few problems in
the law have given greater variety of application and conflict than
the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an em-
ployer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent,
entrepreneurial dealing." 38 The tendency in the present Court is to
leave the task of setting the definitive bounds to the concept of em-
ployment to the legislature. If a labor relations statute can constitu-
tionally be applied to "a wider field than the narrow technical legal
relation of 'master and servant,'" why is not the same true today of
a workmen's compensation act?
35. Gudmundson v. Cardillo, 126 F. 2d 521, 524 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
36. Cudahy v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 423 (1923).
37. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251, 256 (1940).
38. National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 120,
121 (1944).
39. Id. at 124.
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III.
What has been the effect of Crowell v. Benson upon subsequent
cases which have arisen under the Longshoremen's Act? Here again,
one must distinguish between the two "constitutional-jurisdictional"
facts pointed to by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion in that
case and other "statutory-jurisdictional" facts--i. e., between those
whose existence the Chief Justice asserted was necessary to the con-
stitutional operation of the Act and those whose existence was neces-
sary to administrative authority under the Act.
There appears to have been some confusion in the lower federal
courts for several years after Crowell v. Benson as to whether that
case required a trial de novo on all facts upon which administrative
jurisdiction might depend or whether its doctrine was limited to the
two "fundamental" facts enunciated in the opinion.4" Later cases
have, however, made it clear that the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson
must be limited to the two "constitutional-jurisdictional" facts men-
tioned by Chief Justice Hughes.
The first important case which indicates that a trial de novo is
not required where "statutory-jurisdictional" facts under the Long-
shoremen's Act are concerned is South Chicago Coal & Dock Co.
v. Bassett.4  Under the coverage section of the Longshoremen's Act,
no compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death
of "a master or member of a crew of any vessel." 42 The Supreme
Court in the Bassett case held that the administrative finding that a
particular employee was or was not a "member of a crew" was, for
purposes of judicial review, to be treated as an ordinary finding of
fact. "So far as the decision that this employee, who was at work on
this vessel in navigable waters when he sustained his injuries, was or
was not a 'member of a crew' turns on questions of fact, the authority
to determine such questions has been confided by Congress to the
deputy commissioner. Hence the Court of Appeals correctly ruled
that his finding, if there was evidence to support it, was conclusive." 4
The opinion in the Bassett case was written by Chief Justice Hughes
and the opinion in Crowell v. Benson is nowhere cited. Implicit in
the decision of the Court is the holding that, where the two facts named
in Crowell v. Benson are not in dispute, the scope of ,review is limited
40. Compare, e. g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 94 F. 2d 190 (5th Cir.
1938), with South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 104 F. 2d 522 (7th Cir.
1939), aff'd 309 U. S. 251 (1940).
41. 309 U. S. 251 (1940).
42. 44 STAT. 1426 (1927), 33 U. S. C. § 903 (a) (1) (1946).
43. 309 U. S. 251, 257 (1940). Accord, Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U. S. 565
(1944); Schantz v. Am. Dredging Co., 138 F. 2d 534 (3d Cir. 1943); Hagens v.
United Fruit Co., 135 F. 2d 842 (2d Cir. 1943). Cf. Taylor v. McManigal, 89 F. 2d
583, 584 (6th Cir. 1937).
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by the "substantial evidence" rule. This is true even though the fact
at issue be one upon which the administrative power to award com-
pensation depends-as was the fact involved in the Bassett case.
The principle of the Bassett case has been applied to a large num-
ber of factual determinations by the federal courts. Thus, the "sub-
stantial evidence" rule has been held to apply to review of findings by
the deputy commissioner that the injury arose out of and in the course
of employment; "4 that the disability or death arose out of an "ac-
cidental injury"; 1 that the claimant had suffered a "disability" with-
in the meaning of the Act; 46 that the employment involved was mari-
time in character; " that the death was not occasioned by the willful
intention of the employee to kill himself; 4 that the claimant was
"dependent" upon the deceased employee; 41 that the claimant was
the wife of the deceased employee; '0 that the claimant widow was
living apart from the deceased employee "for justifiable cause or by
reason of his desertion"; " and that the employer had timely notice of
injury.52
Thus it seems clear that the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson has
not been applied to findings of fact other than the two "fundamental"
facts enumerated by Chief Justice Hughes in that case. Have the two
facts expressly named by Chief Justice Hughes as subject to a trial
de novo--4. e., the locality of injury and the employment relation-
been treated any differently by the Longshoremen's Act cases since
Crowell v. Benson?
44. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469 (1947) ; Parker v. Motor
Boat Sales, 314 U. S. 244 (1941); Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U. S. 162 (1933) ;
Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Henderson, 175 F. 2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Kwasizur v.
Cardillo, 175 F. 2d 235 (3d Cir. 1949); Granholm v. Cardillo, 116 F. 2d 948 (D. C.
Cir. 1940) ; Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F. 2d 464 (2d Cir. 1939) ; McNeely v.
Sheppeard, 89 F. 2d 956 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Todd Dry Docks v. Marshall, 61 F. 2d 671
(9th Cir. 1932).
45. Powell v. Hoage, 57 F. 2d 766 (D. C. Cir. 1932); Southern S. S. Co. v.
Norton, 41 F. Supp. 108 (E. D. Pa. 1941); Wood Preserving Corp. v. McManigal,
39 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky. 1941); Southern Shipping Co. v. Lawson, 5 F. Supp.
321 (S. D. Fla. 1933).
46. Southern S. S. Co. v. Norton, 101 F. 2d 825 (3d Cir. 1939); St. Regis Paper
Co. v. McManigal, 67 F. Supp. 146 (N. D. N. Y. 1946); McCarthy Stevedoring
Corp. v. Norton, 40 F. Supp. 960 (E. D. Pa. 1940); Valeri v. Lowe, 26 F. Supp.
761 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); Eastern S. S. Lines v. Monahan, 21 F. Supp. 535 (D. Me.
1947).
47. Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Lawson, 149 F. 2d 853 (5th Cir. 1945).
48. Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U. S. 280 (1935); Salmon Bay Sand Co. v.
Marshall, 93 F. 2d 1 (9th Cir. 1937).
49. Harris v. Hoage, 66 F. 2d 801 (D. C. Cir. 1933); Texas Employers' Ins.
Ass'n v. Sheppeard, 62 F. 2d 122 (5th Cir. 1932); Traveller's Ins. Co. v. Parker,
40 F. Supp. 692 (E. D. Va. 1941).
50. Freeman S. S. Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 F. 2d 321 (9th Cir. 1949). Cf. Green v.
Crowel, 69 F. 2d 762 (5th Cir. 1934).
51. .. E. Haddock v. Pillsbury, 60 F. Supp. 806 (N. D. Cal. 1945) ; Associated
Operating Co. v. Lowe, 52 F. Supp. 550 (E. D. N. Y. 1943). Cf. Southern Ry. Co.
v. Cartwright, 77 F. 2d 546 (D. C. Cir. 1935).
52. Seaboard Marine Repair Co. v. Cardillo, 166 F. 2d 431 (2d Cir. 1948).
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So far as an analysis of the reported decisions reveals, subsequent
cases arising under the Longshoremen's Act have afforded a trial de
novo on the factual issues of locality of injury and employment, where
one has been demanded.53 Yet even with regard to these two "funda-
mental" facts, limitations have been imposed. In the first place, even
under Crowell v. Benson, the action to set aside the compensation
award must be brought within the 30-day period provided in the
statute 54 or the award becomes final, even as to the "fundamental"
facts specified by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes. "5  If one carries the rea-
soning in Crowell v. Benson to its logical conclusion, it would seem
that judicial review of the two "constitutional-jurisdictional" facts
specified in that opinion should be available even after the period
specified in the enabling Act has expired. If these "fundamental" facts
did not exist, the order of the deputy commissioner should still be sub-
ject to collateral attack within the common-law rule that judgments
made without jurisdiction are void."6 The time limit in the statute
should not be binding upon the court where review is sought on the
jurisdictional issue. "The jurisdiction of the administfative officer to
take any action at all is dependent upon the fact of employment, and
this factual question is one which Congress had no power to take away
from the court." 17 Crowell v. Benson is not, however, extended this
far. The failure to seek a judicial review of the jurisdictional question
of employment within the 30-day period specified in the Act has been
held to foreclose that question.
An even more important limitation upon the requirement imposed
by Crowell v. Benson of a trial de novo is that stated in Moran v.
Lowe.58 That case dealt with the important question of whether the
trial de novo of issues of "constitutional-jurisdictional" fact was a man-
datory or discretionary requirement.5" The court in the Moran case
held that the granting of a trial de novo on such issues was within the
discretion of the district court. An interpretation of Crowell v. Benson
53. Pittsburgh S. S. Co. v. Brown, supra note 3; Cardillo v. Mockabee, 102 F.
2d 620 (D. C. Cir. 1939); Metropolitan Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 72 F. 2d 175 (D. C.
Cir. 1934) ; Ford v. Parker, 52 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md. 1943) ; West Ky. Coal Co. v.
McManigal, 51 F. Supp. 781 (E. D. Ill. 1943); Tucker v. Norton, 49 F. Supp. 483
(E. D. Pa. 1943) ; State Comp. Fund v. Pillsbury, 27 F. Supp. 852 (S. D. Cal. 1939).
Cf. Tyler v. Lowe, 138 F. 2d 867 (2d Cir. 1943); Wood Towing Corp. v. Parker,
76 F. 2d 770 (4th Cir. 1935); Baltimore & 0. R. R. Co. v. Clark, 59 F. 2d 595
(4th Cir. 1932); Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Norton. 54 F. Supp. 1 (E. D. Pa. 1944).
54. 33 U. S. C. §921 (a) (1946).
55. Pillsbury v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 85 F. 2d 758 (9th Cir. 1936).
56. See Swofford v. Int. Mercantile Co., 113 F. 2d 179, 182 (D. C. Cir. 1940);
Campbell v. Lowe, 10 F. Supp. 288 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).
57. Circuit Judge Wilbur, dissenting in Pillsbury v. Alaska Packers Ass'n,
85 F. 2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1936).
58. 52 F. Supp. 39 (D. N. J. 1943).
59. See Larson, The Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact," 15 TEMP. L. Q. 185,
206 (1941).
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any other way, asserts District Judge Meaney, "would nullify the
whole purpose of the creation of the Commission for determination of
compensation matters. If a trial de novo were a matter of right, with-
out discretion of the reviewing court, then the Commission would have
no proper reason for existence and all matters relating to employee's
compensation might more effectively be heard by this court in the first
instance without preliminary recourse to futile appearances before the
Commission." 8 0
Aside from the limitations just discussed, the doctrine of Crowell
v. Benson has been consistently applied by the lower federal courts irz
cases where the facts of locality of injury and/or employment have
been at issue.6 At the same time, as we have seen, the cases since
1932 have strictly limited the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson to the two
"fundamental" facts expressly named in that case. As recently put
by Circuit Judge Frank, "that doctrine strictly limits the category of
jurisdictional questions." 62 Beyond this, the lower federal courts have
been unable to go. There may be no logical reason for differentiating
the fact of employment from other "statutory-jurisdictional" facts un-
der the Longshoremen's Act. But there is still the authority of Crowell
v. Benson for such differentiation-and that case has never been ex-
pressly overruled by the Supreme Court. The present status of Crowell
v. Benson in cases under the Longshoremen's Act is thus that stated
by a district judge who admitted that he was "in full accord with the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis" in Crowell v. Benson. "But
unless and until the decision is overruled by the Supreme Court, it is
controlling upon me. . . . While [later] decisions indicate that the
Supreme Court has no intention of extending the doctrine of 'juris-
dictional fact' and while they may indeed presage the overruling of
Crowell v. Benson, they do not go far enough to warrant me in refusing
to consider as 'jurisdictional facts' the exact facts which the Supreme
Court in that case held to be such." 63
IV.
Two years after Crowell v. Benson was decided, Circuit Judge
Learied Hand asserted that its doctrine was expressly confined "to
transactions inter partes; dealings of the government with its citizens
were expressly excluded. Were its scope not so confined, it
would have overthrown the accepted procedure of the Interstate Com-
60. 52 F. Supp. 39 (D. N. J. 1943). But cf. Tucker v. Norton, 49 F. Supp. 483,
484 (E. D. Pa. 1943) ; Gudmundson v. Cardillo, 35 F. Supp. 527 (D. D. C. 1940).
61. Cases cited note 53 su/rra.
62. Seaboard Marine Repair Co. v. Cardillo, 166 F. 2d 431, 432 (2d Cir. 1948).
Cf. Eschbach v. Brown, 84 F. Supp. 825, 827 (N. D. 111. 1949).
63. Tucker v. Norton, 49 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
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merce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Shipping
Board, the Board of Tax Appeals, and, we should suppose, the assess-
ment of damages in the admiralty by a commissioner." "'
In Judge Hand's view, Crowell v. Benson is limited to cases such
as.those under the Longshoremen's Act, where the dispute is between
two private parties--i. e., "where the State supplies, in the agency
that conducts the proceeding, a special tribunal for determining a
controversy between two or more outside interests." 6' This would
leave unaffected- by Crowell v. Benson by far the more important group
of cases involving decisions by administrative agencies-i. e., those
where "the State, acting through the agency that conducts the pro-
ceeding, is itself in effect one of the two parties to the proceeding." 61
The basis for this distinction is to be found in Chief Justice Hughes'
statement in Crowell v. Benson that "the distinction is at once ap-
parent between cases of private right and those which arise between
the Government and persons subject to its authority in c6nnection with
the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or
legislative departments." 17 Illustrations of agencies created for the
determination of cases of the latter class "are found in connection with
the exercise of the congressional power as. to interstate and foreign
commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the
facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans." Is
The view of judge Hand thus finds some support in the opinion
of the Court in Crowell v. Benson. On the other hand, aside from the
passage of Chief Justice Hughes just quoted, there is no reason to
suppose that the doctrine was not intended to be applicable to the entire
field of administrative law. If the scope of review of a compensation
award under the Longshoremen's Act is not limited by the "substantial
evidence" rule insofar as the facts upon which the constitutional juris-
diction of the agency depends, why should not the same be true of any
other agency which makes a decision under its particular enabling
Act? 69
A number of cases since Crowell v. Benson have applied its re-
quirement of broad review to agencies other than that administering
the Longshoremen's Act, and these cases have not been limited to those
involving disputes between two private parties, to which alone, Judge
64. Kreutz v. Durning, 69 F. 2d 802, 804 (2d Cir. 1934). Accord: Sheridan
Mills v. Cassidy, 17 F. Supp. 598, 600 (D. Wyo. 1937).
65. 1 BENJAMIN, ADmINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN NEW YORK 25 (1942).
66. Ibid.
67. 285 U. S. 22, 50 (1932).
68. Id. at 51. See Note, 46 HARv. L. IEv. 478, 483 (1933).
69. The problem under Crowell v. Benson is one of the scope, not of the avail-
ability, of review. Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 95 F. 2d 203 (9th Cir. 1938);
The Olympia, 58 F. 2d 638 (D. Conn. 1932).
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Hand asserted, Crowell v. Benson could be applied.7 0  Thus, a few
years after Crowell v. Benson, Circuit Judge Sibley assumed that its
doctrine was applicable in cases involving orders of the National Labor
Relations Board. "Nor do we think," said he by way of obiter in an
action to enjoin that agency, "that the Board's findings of the facts
on which jurisdiction rests will conclude a court when reviewing a
final order under the procedure fixed by the act, but under a proper con-
struction of the act jurisdictional findings will be subject to full
judicial review." 71
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.72 is of great
interest in this respect, for it is the one case involving a direct applica-
tion of Crowell v. Benson to another administrative agency to reach
the Supreme Court. That case involved an action by the Government
to enjoin the construction of a dam upon a certain river otherwise than
under a license to be issued by the Federal Power Commission. The
question of whether a license was required from the Commission was
dependent upon whether the river concerned was a navigable water of
the United States or whether the proposed structure would interfere
with the navigable capacity of a navigable water of the United States.
The FPC had found that the river was navigable and that the dam
would affect interstate commerce and it was contended that the Com-
mission's findings on these points were conclusive if supported by sub-
stantial evidence. The district court, however, held that administrative
findings on these matters were not final but subject to the determina-
tion of the courts upon a trial de novo under Crowell v. Benson,
73
and, after a lengthy trial, the court found that the river was non-
navigable and that the dam would not adversely affect navigability or
interstate commerce. The decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who expressly approved the grant-
ing of a trial de novo on the issues of navigability and effect upon inter-
state commerce:
Assuming that the finding of the Commission is a relevant
fact for the consideration of the court, and that it is entitled to
70. The examples given in the opinion in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 59
(1932), indicate also that its doctrine is not s6 limited. On cases involving disputes
between two private parties, see Utah Copper Co. v. Railroad Retirement Board,
129 F. 2d 358 (10th Cir. 1942). But cf. Universal Carload Co. v. Railroad Retire-
ment Board, 172 F. 2d 22 (D. C. Cir. 1948).
71. Bradley Lumber Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 84 F. 2d 97, 100
(5th Cir. 1936. Cf. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board,
110 F. 2d 179, 180 (4th Cir. 1940); National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry
Cotton Mills, 98 F. 2d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 1938) ; David L. Moss Co. v. United States,
103 F. 2d 395, 397 (C. C. P. A. 1939). The Moss case has seemingly been over-
ruled by United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U. S. 371 (1940).
72. 311 U. S. 377 (1940), reversing 107 F. 2d 769 (4th Cir. 1939) ; 23 F. Supp. 83
(W. D. Va. 1938).
73. 23 F. Supp. 83, 116 (W. D. Va. 1938).
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careful and respectful consideration as the opinion of a body in-
formed by experience, nevertheless it cannot properly be regarded
as controlling judicial determination on the record in the case.
Clearly the decision of the district court involved a constitutional
question of the jurisdiction of the Commission in relation to the
distribution of state and federal power, and of riparian property
rights of the defendant. . . . In that view it is clear that the dis-
trict judge was required to determine the question of fact de novo
on the record made at the trial before him.
74
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the courts below that
the particular river was non-navigable--its "conclusion resting on find-
ings of fact made here de novo, and in contradiction of the concurrent
findings of the two courts below." '5 With regard to the question of
the applicability of the doctrine of. Crowell v. Benson, there appears
only the following brief footnote in Mr. Justice Reed's opinion:
In both courts below the Government unsuccessfully urged
that the findings of the Commission, if supported by substantial
evidence, were conclusive. Although it still regards this conten-
tion as correct, the Government does not seek to have this Court
pass on it in this case.
76
It is not clear just what this statement means. "There is something
almost mysterious about this abrupt abandonment of a contention which
was vigorously urged in the two courts below, and which the Govern-
ment still says it believes to be correct." 77 At any rate, it is clear that
the conclusion of the lower courts that Crowell v. Benson required a
trial de novo of the issues of navigability and effect upon interstate
commerce was not interfered with by the Supreme Court. If Crowell
v. Benson has no applicability to such a case, should not the Supreme
Court have reversed for the failure of the courts below to confine the
scope of their review to that imposed by the "substantial evidence" rule?
Does not its failure to do so imply a belief by the Court in 1940 that
Crowell v. Benson did apply in other than Longshoremen's Act cases?
The Appalachian Electric Power Co. case can thus be considered
as impliedly holding that the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson is not
limited to cases arising under the Longshoremen's Act, or even to
cases involving disputes between two private parties. In the opinion
of at least one district court, indeed, Crowell v. Benson has imported
the doctrine of "jurisdictional fact" in the broadest sense into the gen-
74. 107 F. 2d 769, 791 (4th Cir. 1939), citing Crowell v. Benson. Accord: Ap-
palachian Electric Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 6, 19 (W. D. Va. 1933), rev'd on other
grounds, 67 F. 2d 451 (4th Cir. 1933).
75. Roberts, J., dissenting in 311 U. S. 377, 429 (1940).
76. Id. at 402, n. 7.
77. Larson, supra note 59 at 188, n. 15.
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eral law of judicial review of administrative action. "Upon a judicial
review of administrative orders and decisions, a court may receive new
evidence to determine whether the administrative official or body acted
within the scope of the statutory authority conferred." 71
Even if Crowell v. Benson is applicable to judicial review gen-
erally, its effect is not as broad as this statement indicates. In cases
arising under the Longshoremen's Act, as we have seen, Crowell v.
Benson does not require a broad review of all factual issues upon which
the administrative power to act under the enabling statute depends.
It requires such review only with regard to the two "fundamental"
facts whose existence Chief Justice Hughes asserted was necessary to
the constitutional operation of the statutory scheme. The application
of Crowell v. Benson to other than Longshoremen's Act cases should
be limited in the same manner, and most of the cases which have ap-
plied its doctrine to other agencies have so limited it.
The most recent cases to illustrate this have arisen under the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940."1 Under section 5 (d)
of that statute, "Regular or duly ordained ministers of religion .
shall be exempt from training and service . . . under this Act." Cox
v. United States 80 presented the question of the scope of review of a
selective service classification in a trial for absence without leave from
a civilian public service camp. Defendants were Jehovah's Witnesses
who were classified as conscientious objectors despite their claim to
classification as ministers of religion. They claimed that their status
as ministers was a "jurisdictional" fact which may be determined
de novo in a criminal trial. "That is, since ministers of religion are
exempted from any service, the registrant under trial for violating
section 311 may show the fact to be that he is a minister of religion
and not merely that the evidence before the board was in substantial
support of the board's classification." 81 But, says Circuit Judge
Stephens in the court below, Crowell v. Benson holds only "that
findings of fact of an administrative agency which go to the jurisdiction
of the agency and which affect constitutional rights are not conclusive
and may be tried by the courts de novo. Where only statutory rights
are involved, as in our cases (ministers of religion have no constitu-
tional rights to exemption from military or other service) the findings
of fact are final if substantially supported by evidence before the
78. United States v. Int. Freighting Corp., 20 F. Supp. 357, 358 (S. D. N. Y.
1937) (Emphasis added). Cf. Pettibone v. Cook County, 31 F. Supp. 881, 886 (D.
Minn. 1940); Hudson & Manhattan Co. v. Hardy, 22 F. Supp. 105, 113 (S. D.
N. Y. 1938). The Hudson & Manhattan case is apparently inconsistent with Shields
v. Utah I. C. R. Co., 305 U. S. 177 (1938).
79. 54 STAT. 885 (1940); 50 U. S. C. App. § 301 (1946).
80. 332 U. S. 442 (1947), affrning 157 F. 2d 787 (9th Cir. 1946).
81. 157 F. 2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1946).
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agency." 82 With this statement of the scope of review, the Supreme
Court concurred. "It seems to us that it is quite in accord with jus-
tice to limit the evidence as to status in the criminal trial on review
of administrative action to that upon which the Board acted." 83
The doctrine of Crowell v. Benson is thus limited to issues of
fact on which the constitutional validity of administrative action de-
pends, 4 both in cases under the Longshoremen's Act and in the gen-
eral law of judicial review. Yet even so limited, the application of
the doctrine presents some difficulty. As Professor Dickinson has
pointed out:
It would be not merely inconvenient and burdensome to the
courts, but altogether disruptive of administrative processes, to
hold that every fact-issue on which a claim of constitutional right
can be made to depend becomes thereby entitled to a retrial on
new evidence in a review proceeding at law. The reason is that
. . . there is practically no issue going to the substantial merits
of a controversy which if "unreasonably" decided by an adminis-
trative tribunal cannot be made the basis of a claim of constitu-
tional right."'
This is the great weakness of Crowell v. Benson. Must the court in
an action brought to enforce a National Labor Relations Board order
containing provisions for reinstatement of employees with back pay
afford a trial de novo merely because of the employer's allegation
that he is deprived of property without due process when he is ordered
to pay back wages? 86  Must a complainant who asserts that he was
entitled to a permit under the "grandfather" clause of the Motor Car-
rier Act 8 be given a trial de novo in an action to set aside an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission which denied his application
because he contends that an adverse decision under the grandfather
clause, if it puts the applicant out of business, constitutes a violation
of due process? 8s
82. Ibid.
83. 332 U. S. 442, 454 (1947). Accord: Smith v. United States, 157 F. 2d 176, 184
(4th Cir. 1946). For like holdings involving other types of administrative action,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 107 F. 2d 402, 409 (9th Cir. 1939); Ispass v.
Pyramid Motor Corp., 59 F. Supp. 341, 343 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); Board of Pub.
Ut. Com'rs. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 543, 549 (D. N. J. 1917). Cf. National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940, 947 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
84. Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F. 2d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1942),
affirmed 317 U. S. 501 (1943) ; Hartford Gas Co. v. Securities & Exchange Com'n.,
129 F. 2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1942).
85. Dickinson, supra note 14 at 1077.
86. See National Labor Relations Board v. Louisville Refining Co., 102 F. 2d
678 (6th Cir. 1939).
87. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), 49 U. S. C. §301 (1946).
88. Transamerican Freight Lines v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 405 (D. Del.
1943).
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As we have seen, in cases under the Longshoremen's Act, the
lower federal courts will continue to afford a trial de novo of the facts
of locality and employment-at least until Crowell v. Benson is ex-
pressly repudiated by the Supreme Court. If Crowell v. Benson is
applicable to cases under the National Labor Relations Act, 9 the
analogous "fundamental" facts which have to be found under that
statute would seem to be that the employer is engaged in interstate
commerce9o and that there is an "employer-employee" relationship."
But National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications"2 indi-
cates that the finding of the NLRB that there is an employment rela-
tionship is now given the same degree of conclusiveness as any other
administrative fact findings. The task of making a "completely
definitive limitation around the term 'employe'," Mr. Justice Rutledge
asserted in that case, has been assigned primarily to the Board:
Everyday experience in the administration of the statute
gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of
employment relationships in various industries, with the abilities
and needs of the workers for self-organization and collective
action, and with the adaptability of collective bargaining for the
peaceful settlement of their disputes with their employers. The
experience thus acquired must be brought frequently to bear on
the question who is an employee under the Act. Resolving that
question, like determining whether unfair labor practices have
been committed, "belongs to the usual administrative routine" of
the Board . . . the Board's determination that specified persons
are "employees" under this Act is to be accepted if it has "war-
rant in the record" and a reasonable basis in law.
93
And other cases imply that the same is true of the Board's finding
that the employer's business affects interstate commerce. 94
It is difficult to see why the existence of an employment relation-
ship is "fundamental" to administrative jurisdiction under the Long-
shoremen's Act but not under the Labor Act. The Hearst case thus
indicates one of two things. Either the doctrine of Crowell v. Benson
is not now applicable to non-Longshoremen's Act cases, in which'
event review of all administrative fact findings in such cases is gov-
erned by the "substantial evidence" rule; or Chief Justice Hughes'
89. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 151
(Supp. 1948).
90. See Washington Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U. S.
142, 147 (1937).
91. See Mooresville Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board, 110 F. 2d
179, 180 (4th Cir. 1940).
92. 322 U. S. 111 (1944).
93. Id. at 130, 131.
94. See National Labor Relations Board v. Cudahy Packing Co., 34 F. Supp.
53, 60 (D. Kan. 1940). Cf. Santa Cruz Fruit Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
303 U. S. 453, 467 (1938).
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assumption in Crowell v. Benson that the existence of an employment
relationship is essential to the constitutional operation of a statutory
scheme such as workmen's compensation is no longer true. For, if
the "employer-employee" relation is necessary to the validity of a
compensation statute, why is not the same also tiue of a labor relations
act ?
Regardless of which proposition is the correct one, the applica-
tion of Crowell v. Benson to non-Longshoremen's Act cases appears
to have been definitely limited by the Hearst decision. Either it is not
applicable at all in such cases or it applies to an even narrower class
of fact findifgs than those of the type named in Chief Justice Hughes'
opinion. The doctrine of Crowell v. Benson is thus well on the way
(if, indeed, it has not gone all the way under the Hearst case) to
suffering the fate of the "statutory-jurisdictional" fact doctrine. A
number of Supreme Court decisions in the past decade show clearly
that today "jurisdictional facts, which are such because of statute,
are entitled to no greater scope of review than non-jurisdictional
facts." 15 If Crowell v. Benson is no longer applicable to non-Long-
shoremen's Act cases, the same is now true in such cases of "funda-
mental jurisdictional" facts of the type indicated by Chief Justice
Hughes in his opinion in that case.
V.
Does the ghost of Crowell v. Benson still walk? In cases under
the Longshoremen's Act, as we have seen, that case is still alive; for it
is followed by the lower-federal courts in cases where the exact facts
enumerated as "fundamental" by Chief Justice Hughes are involved.
In non-Longshoremen's Act cases, on the other hand, Crowell v.
Benson has not been cited favorably since the Appalachian Electric
Power Co. case" and the decision of the Supreme Court in the Hearst
case seems clearly inconsistent with it. It thus appears most unlikely
that Crowell v. Benson will be applied today to statutes other than the
Longshoremen's Act. As far as the latter statute is concerned, how-
ever, the lower courts will probably follow it until it is expressly
overruled. Consequently it will take an express Supreme Court de-
cision for Crowell v. Benson to be relegated definitely to the deserved
repose which Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserts it has earned.1
7
95. Larson, supra note 59 at 205. The important Supreme Court decisions,
other than the Hearst case and those under the Longshoremen's Act previously cited
are Packard Motor Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 485 (1947);
Unemployment Com'n. v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143 (1946); Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S.
402 (1941); Rochester Tel. Co. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939); Shields
v. Utah I. C. R. Co., 305 U. S. 177 (1938).
96. But see Judge Waller, concurring in National Labor Relations Board v.
Robbins Tire Co., 161 F. 2d 798, 805 (5th Cir. 1947).
97. Supra note 2.
